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Abstract
Pork production has been evolving from relatively small, family-run operations toward large-scale operations
with several employees. This study uses a national survey of pork producers and their employees to answer
several questions about the structure of wages and benefits in this rapidly changing labor market. The findings
include: 1) wages do not differ across regions of the country but, instead, reflect differences in worker skills
and firm size consistent with a nationally competitive labor market; 2) there is no evidence that large
producers have market power in local labor markets that enable them to pay lower wages than competitors; 3)
rather; large firms pay higher wages, offer better benefits, and safer working environments than smaller firms;
4) the wage premiums in larger firms seem to be partly explained by the greater use of skill-intensive
technologies in large firms; 5) the remaining wage premium in large firms seems to be consistent with returns
to scale that are partly shared with labor; 6) salary, benefits, and a sage working environment all contribute to
worker job satisfaction so that firms offering better working conditions and benefits can pay lower salaries
than competitors with fewer benefits or inferior working environments.
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Abstract
structureofWagM and Benefits in the U.S. Pork Industry
, / Pork production has been evolving fiom relatively small, family-rtm operations toward large-scale
operations with several employees. This study^usM anational survey ofpork producers and their employees to
answer several questioiis about the structure ofwages and ben^ts in this rapidly changing labor market The ..
findings include: 1) wages do not differ across regions of the country but, instead, reflect differences in worker
skills' and finn size consistent with a nationally competitive labor maricet; 2) there isno evidence ^t large
producers have maricet power in io^ labor markers that enable them to pay lower wages than coiiipetitors; 3)
rather; large firms pay higher wageis, offer better benefits, and safer worldng environments than'smaller firms; 4)
the^ge premiums inlarger finns seeni'to be pa^ye^lained by the greater use ofskill-ihtensive technologic in
largefirins; 5) the remaining wage premium in largefiriins seems tobe consistent with returns to scalethat are
partly shared with labor, 6) salary, ^nefits, and a safe working envirorunent all contribute to wpricerjob
satisfaction so that firms offering betterwoiidngconditions andbenefits can pay lowersalaries than competitors
with fewer benefits or inferior working envirorunents. '
. 1 cu
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Poik production in the United States has shifted from relatively small, family-run operations to large-scale
farms with several employees. This trend is illustrated dramatically by aStigler-type (1958) survival analysis in
Figure 1. Production shares in 1990 relative to 1995 are traced out by production size. Ratios above one imply
lost market share, whereas those below one imply rising maiicet share. The pattern shows gains in production
shares for farms with production levels above 3000 hogs per year, with progressively larger gains in market share
as production size increases. Production shares for the smallest farms fell 26 percent, whereas market shares for
the largest farms rose 43 percent. The gains in market share for the largest operations mimic the findings of
declining long-rim average cost in porit production (Good, Hurt, Foster, Kadlec, and Zering, 1995).
Increased scale ofhog production eventually necessitates additional labor services beyond those provided
by family members. Increased scale ofoperation seenns to be complementary with the adoption ofnew
technologies. Some ofthese new technologies require little ifany additional labor while others such asartificial
insemination aremuch more labor intensive. Additionally, many of these new technologies require more skilled
labor. Thus, changes in thestructure ofthepork industry have been accompanied large changes in thedemand
for labor numbers and skills.
The National Poric ProducersCouncil - National HogFarmer Magazine (NPPC-NHF) surveyof poiic
producers and their employees was conducted toshedlighton this rapidly changing rural labormarket. Several
issueswere of particular interest. One issuewaswhether differences in the concentration of large-scale pork
production acrossregions werecreating local labormarkets with idiosyncratic wages or if wagesseemedto be set
consistenUy across regions. I^lated to the issueof local labormarket segmentation is whetherfactorsafiecting
wages in the pork industry are consistent with those in more-established labor markets outside agricultiue. A third
issue is how technologyand size of farm affectwages; if newtechnologies and larger farms are associatedwith
lower unit costs, are these rents shared wiUi labor, or do all benefitsaccrue to management. Alternatively, do
large plants have local monopsony power that enables them to paywagesbelow those of their smaller competitors?
Finally, are hazards associated with the pork production priced in the labor market through compensating wage
differentials, and are benefits also priced? The rapid changes in the structure of the poric industry make it an ideal
candidate for this analysis— there are large differences across farms in technology, size, and location, yet all
factors produce a homogeneous product priced competitively in a national market. Hence, if the labor market in
the industry behaves competitively as well, wages should reOect differences in marginal products across workers
and their farms in a manner consistent with the labor market at large.
We analyze the NPPC- NHF data within the framework of the standard human capital model ofwage
determination developed by Mincer (1974) and reviewed in Willis (1986). We extend the standard model by
analyzing how technology and plant si^ influence wages. We also evaluate the information on compensation and
job attributes in the context of a hedonic framework to calculate trade-offs between alternative benefit packages and
salary. Our results support three main conclusions. First, we do not find substantial evidence of regional or local
labor market segmentation. Differences in wages are explained by traditional measures of human capital, as well
as by differences in gender and firm size consistent with patterns in the labor market as a whole. There is no
evidencethat larger firms pay lowerwages, and in fact, the oppositepattern holds. Part of the wage premium paid
by larger firms is related to a production complementarity between skilled labor and technolo^ use and some to
apparentrent sharingof returns to scale in production. Finally, we find significant and consistent trade-offs
betweensalary, insurance benefits, an employee'sworking conditions, and an employer's provisionof safety
equipment. Hurley,Kli^nstein, and Orazem (1996) found that employees in the hog industry are significanUy
more likely than other farmers to complain about nagging health problems. Together, the results suggest tiiat
employerscompensate, insure, protect, or provide the means to protect their employees' against work-related
health risks.
The paper is organized as follows; Section II estimates a standardhumancapitalearnings functionwith
the additionof gender, firm size, regional and local regressors, and tests for the significance of regional and local
labor market segmentation. Section III re-estimates the earnings functions controlling for technologyuse among
different firms. Section rv estimates the trade-offbetweensalary, fringe benefits, and working conditions.
Section V offers a summaiy and conclusions.
n. Earnings Functions
Difference in marginal products across woricers are typically associated with differences in human
capital. Human capital can begeneral toall jobs, such asthe ^ility toread and write proficienUy, orfirm-
specific, such as theknowledge ofwork rules orstandard operating procedures. General human capital isusually
associated with an individual's years of formaleducation andyearsof experience in the workforce regardless of
current or pastoccupation. Firm-specific human capital is traditioimlly associated with thenumber ofyears that
an individual has woiked for an employer. In addition to human capital, other personal and employer
characteristics have been found important determinants of wages. Womenare traditionally found to earn le^ than
men (Gunderson, 1989)evenwhen human capitaldifferences are heldfixed. Larger firms paymore than smaller
firms (BrownandMedofT, 1989),althoughthe reasonfor thewagepremiumis unclear. If labormaricets are
segmented so that laborcannot flowfreelybetween localmarkets, ^stematic wage differentials mayexistbetween
regions. A standard earnings function that incorporatesthese factors can be written as
(1) \nW= aQ_ + a^K+ a2E + +0^7+0^7^ +agF + ajP +ajN +Raj^ +La^+£
whereIn^ is the natural log of annual wages, K is yearsof formaleducation, E is years of work experience, T is
years offirm tenure, F is a dummy variable that takes thevalue ofoneif the incumbent is female, Pis firm's level
of annualporkproduction, N is sizeof firm's laborforce, R is a vector of regional dummy variables, L is a vector
of local labor maricet variables, and f is a random disturbance. The quadratic terms in job experience and firm
tenuremimic commonly observed concave earningsprofiles overtime if aa > 0, as < 0, > 0 and < 0.
The NPPC-NHF surv^ was sent to 9000individuals designated as employee on the NHF's qualified
mailing list. Of the 9000 survQ's, 1538 were returned for an initial response rateofjust over 17percent. Of
these, 967 or II percent of the original samplehad complete information n^ed for the analysis. The survey
provided direct informationon employee education, tentire, and genderand on firm employment and location.
Experience was measured as the respondent's age minus years of formal education minus six. Annual hog
pr(^uction was reported by size categories, so production was approximated by using midpoints. The largest
categoiy (25,000 or more) was given a value of 40,000.
Local labor market characteristics were constructedby using 1990 census data and 1993Bureau of
Economic Analysis data by county. These regressors included aHerfindahl index ofemployment concentration^
the proportion of the county population over 25 with a high school diploma, the county employment rate, the
countyaverage annual income, and proportion of county employmentin agriculture. Table 1 (a) reports the
means and standard deviations for the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis.
Due to the ordered, categorical nature of annual wage information, the parameters in equation (1) cannot
be estimated directly by using ordinary least squares. Instead, we use an ordered probit specification (Greene,
1990, pp. 703-706). Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients for four alternative models. Model 1 is the full
model, including all Regional and Local labor market characteristics. Model 2 eliminates the Regional
regressors. Model 3 eliminates the Local regressors, and Model 4 eliminates both the Regional and Local
regressors. At the bottom of Table 2 is the maximized value of the log-likelihood fimction and the log-likelihood
ratio tests for Models 2, 3^and 4 against Model I.
First, notice that, at a five-percent level of significance, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the regional
and local labor market characteristics do not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model. In
addition, the estimated coefficientsfor Human Capital, Gender, and Firm Size are consistent with the results of'
other more-established labor markets and are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the local and regional
variables. These results suggest a national market for workers in the pork industry instead of locally segregated
markets.
Ordered probit estimates are based on an artificial index that does not have a direct correspondence to
annual rat^ of return. This makes it difficult to interpret the coefficients. To obtain an estimated annual rate of
return, we regressed the estimated thresholds from the ordered probit on the NPPC-NHF survey's dollar-
denominated thresholds by using ordinary least squares:
(2) • r = y„+y,fi + E
where y is a vector of the surv^'s dollar-denominated thresholds, is a vector of the corresponding estimated
thresholds, and yi are the intercept andslope coefficients, and f^is a standard normal random errorterm.^ By
' This is taken tobeSj-i" where ei is theemployment share oftheith two-digit SIC industiy in thecounty.
Index values close to one represent more concentrated labor markets, and values close to zero reflect broadly
distributed employment across industries.
^These regressions explained more than 98 percent ofthevariation for allfour models.
using the estimatedcoefficientsfrom equation (2), the impliedannual rates of return are estimatedby dividing the
calibrated marginal effects by the calibrated estimated average salary:
^InW
dX,
(3) r = ^
dlnW
where r, is the implied annual rate of return for the /th variable. is the derivative ofequation {1) with
dX,
respect to the /th variable, X is the rowvectorof meansfor the independent variables, and a is the columnvector
of estimated coefficients for equation (1). The results, reported in Table 3 (a), are consistent with earnings
functions in other labor markets. Women earn about 18 percent less than men with comparable human capital
attributes. An additional year of education generates an annud return of about 5 percent of anniial earning. An
additional year of experience and tenure is worth about 1 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively. In addition,
marginal returns to experience increase at a decreasing rate so that lifetime wages peak at about 25 years of
experience. Workers on farms earn an 8 percent premium for every additional 10,000 hogs produced and a l.S
percent premium for every 10 additional fUll-time employees. These last two results indicate that larger firms do
not pay substandard wages, nor do th^ locate atypically in low wage markets.
The premiiun for working in larger operations has been observed in other labor markets. Some
hypotheses a^anced are that larger firmis pay higher wages to obtain higher-^iuality labor, larger firms pay more to
fore^l unionization, larger firms pay more because they can afford to, and larger firms pay more to avoid
monitoring cost. When Brown and Medoff (1989) considered these alternative hypotheses, they found little
support for all but the first. Although Brown and Medoffdid find that larger firms paid more to obtain higher-
quality labor, the support was not strong enough to completely explain the positive relationship between firm size
and wages. Technology information collected by the NiPPC-NHF gives us the opportunity to explore anadditional
hypothesis— that the wage premium reflects specialized skills required by newer technologies, which have been
atypically adopted by larger firms.
HL XechDology and Earnings
Pork production is a biologically constrained process. Stockmust be bred, followed by a fixed gestation
period, birthing, weaning, growing, and finishing. That is not to say that technology cannot help speed or
improvethe process. Artificial insemination can help improvegene pools (Singleton and Schinckel, 1995).
Early weaning may reduce the time betweenbreedingcycles for a sowand reducedisease. Split-sex and phase
feeding can improve nutritionand feedefficiency. All in / all out production can reduce the days to market, and
multiple-site production can help curb the spreadofdisease and reduce death loss. Each of these technologies
improvesefficiency by either speedingup the productioncycle, lowering input cost, or reducing output loss.
Alone or in combination, these technologies have been estimated to reduce the cost of production or incr^se
revenues anywhere from $1.79 to $11.59 per hog (Hurt, 1995).
In addition to improvements in production technologies, improvements in organizational structurecan
help firms allocate resour^s moreefficiently. Computers can reduce the lime required and improve the accuracy
ofmaintaining both production and financial records. Formal management practices suchas the provision of
employee handbooks, written jobd^riptions, work plans, andformal evaluation procedures canhelp efficiently
organize anddirect labor resources. Asfirm size increases, these practices support thedivision of labor into
specializations. Improving laborproductivity translates intoa low^r marginal production cost.
Some technological advances require few if anyspecial skillsto implement. Others require skilled,
quality labor. Some technologies may befeasible only in large operations, whereas others are equally effective
regardless of firm size. Forexample, multiple-site production requires little ifany additional skill on thepartof
labor, but may require greater armual hog production and more fiill-time employees to support. Alternatively, it
requires special training toimplement a program ofartificial insemination ortooperate a computer. Artificial
insemination may beequally effective regardless ofarmual hog production, but also may require additional labor
resources. Computer use may beequally effective regardless ofannual hog production while reducing the labor
requirements for record keying. Ingeneral, however, ifskill-intensive technolo©' adoption ismore viable in
largerfirms, then largerfirmswill haveto payhigherwages to compensate workers for their abillQi' to implement
these technologies.
TheNPPC-NHF survty data afford us the opportunity to determine whether higherwages in largerfirms
are explainable throughmoreadvanced technology adoption. The survey askedemployees if thQ'are currently
usingartificial insemination, splitrsex feeding, phase feeding, multiple siteproduction, segregated earlyweaning,
medicated earlyweaning,modified medicated earlyweaning, and/or all in/all out production methods.
Respondents werealsoaskedif a computer is usedto helpmanage the operation, if employee handbooks, written
job descriptions or workpla^ are provided, and if theyare formally evaluated. For tractability, we combine
segregated earlyweaning, medicated earlyweaning, andmodified medicated earlyweaning intoa singlemeasure
of earlyweaningtechnologies. Provisionof either employee handbooks, writtenjob descriptions, workplans, or
formal evaluations were assumed to indicate the use of formal managementpractices. Summaiy statistics for
these technologies and management variables are reported in Table 1 (a).
Table 4 (a) reports the conditional means for Human Capital and Technologybased on annual hog
production. Larger firms have less experience and tenurepartlybecause thesefirms have recently ^n expanding
their employment Newerhireswill havelesstenure bydefinition. Average education alsodoesnot differ bysize
ofoperation. However, use of all the technologies in Table4 (a) increases with annual hogproduction. It is
possible that larger firms maypaymore to compensate employees for the skills requiredto implement more
advanced technologies.
We test this hypothesis by re-estimatingModels 1-4, controlling for Technology. Table 5 reports the
orderedprobit estimatesfor Human CapUal, Gender^ Firm Size, and Technology. As before, inclusionof
Region^ and Local regressors, the maximized value ofthe log-likelihood fimction, and log-likelihood ratio test for
Models 6,7, and 8 againstModel 5 are also reported. Again, note that there are no significant regional or local
effects. ComparingModels 1-4withModelsS-8, the results are consistent, with two notabledifierences. The
number of full-time employeesis no longer significant, and tenure is now significant at the five percent level.
Formal management practices, artificial insemination, phase feeding, and all in/all out production technologiesare
all positive and significant at the one percent level. All other technology parameters are positive but not
statistically significant.
Table 3 (b) reports.thetechnology controlled implied annual rates of return. Relativeto the estimates in
Table 3 (a), inclusion of Technology reduces the rate of return to education by about 20 percent and, to annual hog
production and munber of iiill-timeemployees, byabout37 percent. The rate of return to tenure for an average
employee increases by about 50 percent. Firms that are better organized in the sense that they use employee
handbMks, written j(k) descriptions, woiic plans, and/or formal evaluations pay their workers about 15 percent
moreannually. The use of artificial insemination, phasefeeding, or all in/all out production technologies
increases worker compensation by about 6 to 7 percent annually.
To gain additional insights into the role of technology in wage determination, we can characterize the
technologies as education-intensive, experience-intensive, labor-intensive and/or scale-intensive through the use of
auxiliary regressions which predict the probability of technology use as a fimction of operation attributes. These
regressions (available fix}m the authors on request) suggest that all the technologies are scale intensive, as
suggested by the cross-tabulations in Table 4 (a). Artificial insemination, phase feeding, multi-site production and
early weaning were labor intensive. Artificial insemination, split-sex feeding, phase feeding, all in/all out and
formal management practices are education intensive. However, none of Uietechnologies are experience-using. In
fact, the education^intensive technologies were experience-saving, consistent with a pattern of recent expansion of
skill'intensive technologies. The technologieswhich significantly increasedwages were the ones associatedwith
education intensi^. Early weaning and multi-site production which were labor- but not atypically skill-intensive
did not alter wages significantly.
The inclusion of the technology regressors reduces the return to employment size by about one-third,
supporting the hypothesis that some of the Brown-Medoff size effect on wages is related to technology choice. In
addition, skills needed to implement new.education-intensive technologies are hired at a wage premium.
Nevertheless, the scale-wage effect is still present, even when technology controls are added, consistent with the
hypothesis that large firms share rents with workers. The reduction in the returns to education in the presence of
technology controls isconsistent with the finding that these t^hnologies are education-intensive. Le^
experienced, educated workers are being hired to implement these new education-intensive technologies. Once
type of technology is controlled, the traditional returns to tenure are once again evident.
IV. Salary^Fringe Benefits, and Working Conditions
Wages are animportant part ofany compensation package, but total compensation generally consists of
more than just wages. Employers offer fringe benefits such as insurance benefits, incentive plans, retirement
plans, paid time off, orin-kind goods and services. Inaddition to alternative goods and services, ah employee's
working conditions are important. Hurley, etal. (1996) found a greater reported incidence ofnagging health
problems for hog operations ingeneral and further evidence ofan even greater incidence ofhealth problems in
confinement operations. Whether these nagging health problems are life threatening ornot, employees may
require compensation tooffset thedisamenity ofunpleasant woridng conditions. Therefore, thecost toan
employer ofhiring anadditional worker isnot just the salary paid to the worker, but also the cost ofany fiinge
benefits and the cost ofproviding acceptable working conditions. The cost ofproviding fiinge benefits is likely to
be less for larger firms, sotheshare ofbenefits in total compensation islikely toincrease with thesize.ofthefirm.
Larger firms may also have a greater incentive to provide safer work environments because the a)sts are spread
overmore output, making the unit cost of safety investment smaller.
Ina competitive labor market, employees choose among alternative compensation packages and working
conditions on the basis oftheir preferences. Favorable tax laws and group discounts due to risk pooling may cause
employees tofavor one dollar ofhealth insurance toone dollar in salary. This provides anopportunity for
employers totrade offemployee salary with fringe benefits and investments inworking conditions inways that
raise worker utility without raising overall labor costs.
Results from earnings fiinction estimates suggest a nationally competitive labor market in pork
production. This suggests thatfirms must offer a compensation package that at least matches theopportunities a
woriter haselsewhere. Let A,betheworkers utility from his
current compensation package, where fT/r is thesalary, Bf is a vector ofbenefits, Zp is a vector ofjobamenities or
disamenities, r,isunobserved tastes, and the rest ofthe variables are as already defined. The worker's opportunity
utility at other firms depends onthe worker's general human capital. This opportunity utility isgiven by
' where thefirst three variables measure worker human capital andZ, represents the
strength ofthelabor market for workers with those skills. Worker satisfaction from thefirm's compensation
package depends upon thedifference in the utility offered by the firm relative totheworker's opportunities
elsewhere, so that
(4) S=U^-U„=^,,B,Z„L„K:,E,J„F„P„N,-,x)>a
where S is some index ofsatisfaction. Worker satisfaction isassumed to bepositively related towages, benefits,
andfirm amenities andnegatively related tofirm disamenities, holding theworker's opportunities elsewhere fixed.
Because there areseveral ways firms canaffect worker utility, it is optimal for firms toadjust theircompensation
package soas toequalize themarginal utility perdollar expended onwages, benefits, andinvestments in working
conditions. Firmsthat havecostadvantages in providing benefits or favorable working conditions would be
expected to offercompensation packages withmore benefits, fewer health risks, and lower wages, otherthings
equal. Because humancapital shouldraiseopportunities elsewhere as wellas compensation within the firm, it
should have no systematic effect on worker satisfaction.
In addition to the individual, firm, and regional variables discussed earlier, the NPPC-NHF survey
collected detailedinformation on fringebenefits andworking conditions. The vectorof fringe benefits was
constructed as follows: Insurancepremiums is the approximated aggregate insurancepremiumpaid by the
employer, constructed byusing surv^ data and information froma local insuranceagent. Afterdetermining
whetheror not an employer offered majormedical, dental, disability, and/or life insuranceto an employee and his
family, we calculated the average proportion of the premium paid byemployers. A local insuranceagent quoted
us the standard premiums paid for an individualwhoseaverageagewas equal to the average age of our
respondents. We calculated an aggregate premiumby summing the average standard premium paid for each
benefitmultipliedby the average proportion of the premium paidby the employer." Admittedly, this
approximation is a rough estimate, but it does capture the ^stematic differences between what benefits are offered
and what percentage of those benefit premiums are paid by an employer on average. Incentive plan is a dummy
variable set equal to one ifan employee indicated receiving performance-based compensation such as a profit-
sharing plan or a bonus paid for greater feed efficiency, reduced death loss, and/or some other measures of
producUon efficiency influenced by an employee. Paid Urae off is adummy vanable that was set equal to one ifan
employee indicated receiving paid vacaUon days, holidays, or sick leave. In-kind transfers was adummy variable
set Mual to one ifan employee indicated receiving paid housing, uUlities, vehicle, processed meat, and/or
.nntinninp educaUon expensBS. Finally, retirement plan is adummy variable that was set equal to one ifan
employee indicated receiving retirement benefits. Each of these benefits is an alternative form of compensation
and is expected to increase satis&ction. , „ j j • •
The vector ofjob amenities and disamenities was constructed as follows. Because dust and gas levels
were both highly correlated with the employee*s reported woridng environment wittothe hog facilities, we used
the measure ofan employee's working environment to construct aset ofdummy variables that capture marginal
differences in woiking conditions. Excellent to good, good to fair, and fair to poor are all dummy variables that
were set equal to zero ifthe employee reported that his working environment was excellent Ifan employee
reported timt his working environment was good, excellent to good was set equal to one, and good to feir and fair
to poor were set equal to zero. Ifanemployee reported that his working environment was fair, excellent togood
andgood tofairwere setequM toone, andfairtopoor was set equal tozero. If ^ employee reported thathis
workingenvironmentwas poor, excellentto good, good to fair and fair to poorwere all set equal to one.
Inasmuchas each dummyvariable represents successive marginal declines in the employee'sworking
environment, negative impacts on satisfactionare expected. Finally, Uie dummy.variable mask or respirator was
set equal to one if an employee indicated that his employerprovideda dust mask or respirator. Because an
employer'sprovisionof a dust mask or respiratorgivesan employee the opportunity for protectionagainstworic-
related health risk, a positive relationship betweenmask provisionand satisfaction is expected.
Table 4 (b) reports the conditional means of our vector of fnnge benefits and working conditions. Notice
that salary and insurance premiums are increasing in annual hog production. Incentive plans and paid time off
are more common in firms with greater annual hog production. In-kind transfers are not as strongly related to a
firm's annual hog production, and retirement plans seem more common in firms with low or veiy high annual hog
production. In terms ofworking conditions, it seems that the largest firm, those producing more than 10,000 hogs
annually, do in fact have the most favorable working conditions. Nearly 85 percent of employees working for
these large firms reported good or excellent working conditions. Alternatively, just over 71 percent ofemployees
working for the sm^lest firms, those producing less than ,2,000 hog annually, reported good orexcellent working
conditions. Firms with higher levels ofproduction are also more likely to supply dust masks or respirators.
Although we do not have a direct measure of utility, we do have a suitable proxy. The NPPC-NHF surv^
asked einplpyees if they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "My salary and benefits are competitive with other
job opportunities in this community." This statement, while indirect, measures how an individual rates job
prospectswithin his community. The more likely an employee is to agree with this statement, the happier an
employee is with his current compensation package and employment. Therefore, we use the probability that an
employeeagrees with this statement as a measure of the employee's utility or level of satisfactionwith the
compensation package and job. Let Yequal one if an employee agreeswith the statement above or zero if he
disagrees. Assumingthat islinear,
(5) Pr(7 =1) =Pr(^(zS +r, >O) =Vx{-X^ ^ =1" .
r(0 is the cumulativedistributionof ly.. On average, almost 78 percentof employees agreedwith the statement.
This agreement generally increased with annual hog production.
The parameters in equation (S) and the likelihood that an employeeagrees with the statement are
estimated byusing the Probit model (seeGreene, 1990, pp. 662-686). Table6 reportsthe estimatedcoefficients
and standard errors. First, notice that all coefficients are of the expected signs with the exception of the paid time
off*, which is not statistically different from zero. The coefficients for Salary, insurance premiums, excellent to
good,good to fair, and mask or respirator are all significant at the five percent level.
The implicit value of firm benefits, amenities, and disamenities is impliedby the parameters in equation
(S). Supposea firm is considering changing a benefit level fromBf to Bp, where we assume, for ease of
exposition, that the vectorBphas onlyonevariable. The worker'svaluationof the benefitchange is the change
from Wp to Wp* neededto leave the woricer's satisfaction unchanged. This compensating wagedifferential is
implicitly defined by
Pr(l' =1) =1- +2Az +®))
=1- r{-{hw, + +Z,<I>,+ <D))
which implies = <t>„Wp +B^<P^ where, for ease ofexposiUon. ®is set equal to the sum ofall
remaining factors weighted by their respective coefficients in equation (5). The dollar trade offbetween benefits
and wages is -i}V^-Wp) / = Similarly, the other tiade-offe are computed by dividing ^
and^by^. This norniali2ation yields marginal trade-oflfs that are measured in terms of salaiy dollars. These
trade-of& are also reported in Table 6.
The dollar equivalents for insurance premiums, excellent to good, good to fair, and mask orrespirator are
all significant atthe five percent level. The dollar equivalent for insurance premiums implies that an employer
can reduce ain employee's salary by about $2.60 for every dollar ofinsurance provide. Given group discounts ^d
favorable tax treatment, we expected this trade offto exceed $1. Employees working infacilities with excellent as
opposed togood working conditions arewilling togive upmore than$10,000 in salary andarestillequally
satisfied with their compensation package. Similarly, employees working in facilities with good as opposed tofair
working conditions arewillingto giveupjust under$8,000 in salary andare still ^ually satisfied with their
compensation packages. Alternatively, by providing a dust mask or respirator, an employer can reduce an
employee's salary byjust over $6,800 while still maintaining the employee's level of satisfactionwith his
compensation package.^
Hog fanners and their employeesare significantly more likelyto report nagging health problems relative
to the population as a whole. These nagginghealthproblems will driveworkers from hogproduction imlessth^
are appropriately compensated. Wefind that employees are in factcompensated for poorer working environments
that lead to increased health risks. Employees express a willingness to accept lower wages in exchange for
protection against the risk of nagging heal^ problems or for insurance that provides treatment should nagging
healthproblems arise. Anemployer canprovide protection by improving theworking environment, or by
providing protective gear such asa dust mask or respirator. The first strategy guarantees a reduction inan
employee's health risk, while thesecond strategy shifts the burden ofprotection totheemployee. While a dust
mask or respirator may beavailable, anemployee must choose touse it soas toreduce any health risk. Therefore,
we would expect employees toprefer thefirst strategy tothesecond as is indicated by thevalue ofthese trade-offs.
Interestingly, while over 80percent ofemployees indicate theprovision ofa dust mask or respirator, only about 20
percent report using them. This suggests that thevalue ofthemask is primarily anoption value. Employees
want theoption touse themask should they choose to do so. Alternatively, health insurance can provide
treatment for employees whofind themselves afflicted with nagging health problems.
^Although these trade-offs are of the correct sign, the magnihides seem high. The estimated dollar trade-oflfs
proved extremely sensitive to the magnitude ofthe coefficient on salary inTable 6.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Increases in firm size and the adoption of new labor-intensive technologies have increased the demand for
labor numbers and skill in rural labor markets. rAlthough anecdotal e^dence of regional differences in wages -
sugg^the possibility ofre^onalor local labor market segmentation, the1995 surv^ datadonotsiipport this
hypothesis. Differences in wagesare consistentwith othercompetitive labormarketsand can be expired by
differences in human capital, gender, and firm.size. Larger firms pay more, in part because of a production
complementarity between skilled labor and technology. However, even controlling for technology, a strong
positive relationship between wages and annual hog production remains. The higher wages offered by larger
firms do not support the hypothesis that largerfirms locate in labormarketswith atypically lowwagesor that
larger firms exercise monopsonypower in local labor markets. The more generous compensation packages paid by
larger firms suggest that rents accrued as a result of cost savings due to economiesof scale are shared with
employees. • • •. . . • . V; t.'
We find significant trade-offs between sal^, insurance premiums, working environment, and an .
employer'sprovisionof a dust mask or respirator. These trade-offs indicate that employees are willing to accept
lowerwages if an employer is willing to provide a less risl^ work environment, supplyvoluntaiy protection, or
insure an empl<^eeagainst work-related health hazards. Therefore, employees.arerequiring either compensation,
protection, or insurance for work-related health risks, and employers are choosing those options for which they
have a comparative advantage in providing. On average,- larger firms provide more generous benefit packages and
safer working environments, suggesting that larger firms may also enjoy returns to scale in the provision of
benefits and investments in workplace safety.
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Figure 1:Ratio ofproduction shares 1990 / 1995 by annual hog production.
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Table 1: (a) Earnings functions descriptive statistics,
(b) Trade-off descriptive statistics.
(a)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Salary" 3.31 1.74
Human Capital
Education 14.04 1.97
Experience 14.05 9.53
Tenure 6.43 6.56
Gender
Female 0.0941 0.2921
Firm Size
Annual Hog Production 1.51 1.47
Number ofFull-Time Employees 1.15 2.35
Regional
Midwest*" 0.6960 0.4602
Northeast® 0.0455 0.2085
Southeast*' 0.1510 0.3582
West® 0.1075 0.3100
Local
Herfmdahl Index 0.1750 0.0560
Proportion with a High SchoolEducation 0.7338 0.0768
Employment Rate 0.6953 0.1300
Average Income S33,845 $7,041
Proportion in Agriculture 0.0138 0.0129
Technology
Formal Management Practices 0.6308 0.4828
Personal Computer 0.6784 0.4673
Artificial Insemination 0.5739 0.4948
Split Sex Feeding 0.4757 0.4997
Phase Feeding 0.5584 0.4968
Multiple-Site Production 0.3847 0.4868
Early Weaning 0.2254 0.4181
All hi/ All Out Production 0.6960 0.4602
' Salaiy codes: 0=Less than $10,000,1=$10,000 to$15,000,2=$15.000 lo$20,000,3=$20.000 lo$25,000,4=$25,000 to$30,000,5=$30,000 to
$35,000,6=$35,000 to $40,000,7=S40.000 to $50,000 and 8°$50,000 to $60,000.
^The midwest region includes: lA,IL, IN,MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, and WI.
*Theooitbeast regim includes: CT,MD,ME,MI,NJ,NY.andPA.
' Thesoutheast re^onincludes: AL, FL, OA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, and WV.
•Thewest region includes: AK, AR, AZ, CA,CO,HI,ID,KS, MT,OK, OR, TX.TJT, WA, andWY.
(b)
Mean Standard DeviationVariable
Satisfied With Compensation 0.7782 0.4157
Salary $24,280 $9,264
Fringe Benefits
0.488hicentive Plan 0.6099
Paid Time Off 0.8238 0.3812
Insurance Premiums $1,459 $1,412 Tt
In-kind Transfers 0.7347 0.4417
Retirement Plan 0.3683 0.4826
Working Conditions
0.4300Excellent to Good 0.7554
Good to Fair 0.2020 0.4017
Fair to Poor 0.0317 0.1752
0.8139 0.3894
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Table 2: Earnings functions.
Model 2 Model 3'" Model 4Model 1'
Human Capital
' - - Education
Experience
Experience^
' Tenure
' Tenure^
0.1521** - ^
(9.58)
0.0692**.
(5.92) '
-0.0014**'
(4.55)
0.0185- '
(1.55)
-0.0003 :
. .- .0.1585**'
(10. io) •
0.0690**
(6.00) 0
^.0014**/
(4.62)
0.01701;
(1-43)
-0.0003
0.1598**
'" " (10.34) '
^ 0.0693**
:*' (i98)
-0.0014**
(4.64)
. • 0.0181
' (1.57)
' 4).0002
0.1650**
(10.80)
0:0692**
(6.01)
-0.0014**
(4.66). ,
0.0178
(1.55) .
• ^.0002
Gender " "" " " ~
. .(0.76) . (0,68) (0.62) . (0.63),
Female -0.5969** -0.5873** -0.5988** -0.5885**
Firm Size
(5.02). (5.09) , (5.13) (5.18)
Annual HogProduction** 0.2635** 0.2668** 0.2562** 0.2636**'
Number ofFull-Time Employees®
O00
(8.63) •
0.0554**-
(8.20)'.
0.0473*'
(8.66)
0.0506**
(2.48) (2.77) (2.32) (2.58)
Regional
included Yes ' •No • "Yes No
Local
liicluded Yes' Yes No • •• No
Number ofObservations 967 967 ' 967 967
. . Log-Likelihood -1689.33^t -1691.736 -1694.143 -1696.128
4.80 , 9.62 • 13.59
*Theabsolutevalue of the t-sUtisticis indicatedin parentheses.;
^Likelihoodfalio testofrestrictions against Model 1.
*Si9uficaat at the 5% level.
''Si^uficantatthe l%levet.
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Table 3: (a) Implied rates ofreturn *
(b) Technology controlled implied annual rates ofreturn.
(a)
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4Model 1
Human Capital
Education 4.83% ' 5.05% ' - ,5.11% 5.29%
Experience 0.94% 0.95% , 0.94% 0.94%
• Tenure 0.47% 0.44% . . .0,4?%i 0.47%
Gender
-Female -18.97% -18.73% -19.14% -18.85%
Firm Size • • •
Annual HogProduction'' 8.37% 8.51% • 8.19% 8.45%
Number ofFull-Time Employees^ 1.63%, 1.77% . 1.51% 1.62%
•,
(b) ;
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Human Capital . •
Education 3.75% 3.97% ' 3.96% ^20%
Experience 0.97% 0.98% 0.96% 0.97%
Tenure , 0.74% 0.71% 0.75% 0.75%
Gender
— — - • - -
Female -17.93% -17.72% ^ -18.11% -17.86%
Firm Size
Annual Hog Production^ 4.86% 5.03% 4.70% 5.15%
Number of Full-Time Employees® 0;98% - •1.11%-' 0.85% 0.99%
Technology ,
\
Formal Nbnagement Practices 14.62% 14.54% • 14.78% 15.08%
Personal Computer - 4.56% - . 4;68% - 4.55% 4.23%
Artificial Insemination. 7.14% 7.27% 7.35% 7.49%
Split Sex Feeding 2.90% 2.64% 2.62% 2.38%
Phase Feeding 7.09% 6.93% 7.28% • - 6.84%
Multiple-Site Production 1.06% 0.83% 1.02% 0.56%
F^rly Weaning 4.44% 4.59% 4.50% 4.27%
All In/ All Out Production 6.33% 6.41% 6.46% 6.04%
' All ratesofretum are evaluatedat the sanqilemeans.
^Per 10.000 bogs.
*Per 10fiiil4ime enq>]oyees.
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T^le 4: (a) Conditional human capital and technology means based on annual hog production.
(b) Conditional fringe benefit and working conditionmeansbased on annual hog production.
(a)
Annual Hog Production
Less-), 2,000 3,000 5,000 More
Than, ,, to to than
2,000 2,999 - 4,999 9,999 10,000
Salary 2.61 2.58 ' ' 2.81 , 3.06 3.91
Human Capital
Education 14.25 • 13.89 13.75 . 13.68 14.19
Experience 16.05 15.32 13.18 14.30 13.23
Tenure 9.21 ; 8.06 7.19i 6.25 5.03
Gender • 1
Female 0.1146 0.0652 0.0094 0.1032 0.1094'
Firm Size' / *
Number ofFull-Time Employees 0.2548 . 0.2185 0.2500 0.3929 2.1201
Technology .
Formal Ma^gement Practices 0.4331 ' 0.4239 0.4434, 0.5226 0.8206
Personal Computer 0.4841 0.6522 0.6321 0.6581 0.7681
Artificial insemination 0.3503 0.3261 0.4057 0:5355 0.7527
Split Sex Feeding 0.2229 0.2609 0.4057 0.4774 0.6214
Pha^ Feeding 0.3758 0.5000 0.6132 0.6065 0:6039;
Multiple-Site Production 0.2038 0.1848 • 0.2075:- 0.2968 .-^0.5580
F^rly Weaning 0.0892 0.1630 0.1698 0.2065 0.3042
All In/ All Out Production 0.4522 0.5652 • 0.6226. J 0;7677 0.7987
Number ofObservations 157 - 92 • 106 155 457
f
1
(b)
, • 1
Annual Hog Production
Less 2,000 ' 3,000' • 5,000 More
Than to to to than
2,000 2^999. 4,999 ' " 9,999' 10,000
Satisjied With Compensation 0.6842 0.6979 • , 1 0.7857 0.7578 0.8282
Salary $20,444 > $20,208 $21,496 $22,748 $27,413
FringeBenefits . f ' • .1 • • ,
Incentive Plan 0.3224 . 0.4583 0.5446 0.5652 0.7587
Paid Time-Off 0.5329 * 0.6979 0.8214 0.8075 0.9448 •
Insurance Premiums $986 $1,333 $1,374 $1,386 $1,674
In-kind Transfers 0.6842 0.7396 0.7321 0.7578 0.7423
Retirement Plan 0.2632' 0.2396 0.1607, 0.2050 0.5276
Working Conilitions , , •
—
Excellent to Good 0.8487 0.7813 , 0.7679 0.7888 0.7076
Good to Fair 0.2829 0.2500 " 0.1964 0.2484 0.1534
Fair to Poor 0.0263 — 0.0104 • - ~ 0.0268 0.0435. - 0.0348
Mask or Respirator 0.6513 0.6667 0.7679 . 0.8199 0.9018
Number ofObservations 152 96 112 161. 489
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Table 5: Technology Augmented Earnings Functions. .
Model 5" Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Human Capital
Education 0.1249** 0.1315** 0.1311** 0.1387**
' (7.61) (8.11) (8.20) (8.78)
Experience 0.0704** 0.0703** 0.0702** 0.0703**
- (5.92) (6.02) (5.91) (5.99)
E?q)erience^ -0.0014** -0.0013** -0.0014** -0.0014**
(4.26) (4.33) (4.27) (4.34)
Tenure 0.0306* 0.0291* 0.0304* 0.0303*
(2.46) (2.34) (2.53) (2.51)
Tenure^. -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(1.16) (1.08) (1.09) (1.12)
Gender r» ,
Female -0.5967** -0.5874** -0.5998** -0.5893**
(5.09) (5.21) (5.24). (5.33)
Firm Size
Annual Hog Production 0.1616** 0.1667** 0.1556** 0.1698**
(4.65) (4.87) (4.50) (5.10)
Number ofFull-Time Employees 0.0326 0.0368 0i0282 0.0328
• (1.55) (1.82) (1.36) (1.64)
Technology
' Formal Management Practices 0.4865** • 0.4820** 0.4897**^. 0.4973**
(6.13) • (6.12) (6.29) _ (6.41)
Personal Computer 0.1517 0.1550 0.1506 0.1395
(1.87) (1.93) (1-87) (1.76)
Artificial Insemination 0.2376** 0.2410** 0.2434** 0.2471**
(2.89) (2.94) (3.12) (3.18)
Split Sex Feeding 0.0964 0.0876 0.0869 0.0784
(1.21) (1.10) (1.10) (1.00)
Phase Feeding 0.2358** 0.2299** 0.2411»* 0.2258**
(3.15) (3.07) (3.24) (3.03)
Multiple-Site Production 0.0353 0.0277 0.0339 0.0185
- : -(0.43) (0.34) (0.41) (0.23)
Early Weaning ' 0.1477 • 0.1521 0.1491 0.1410
- (1.68) (1.75) (1.71) (1.63)
All In/ All Out Production 0.2105** 0.2124** 0.2138** 0.1993**
(2.73) (2l76) (2.80) (2.63)
Regional -
Included Yes No • Yes No
Local ' '
Includied ' Yes Yes No No
N 967 967 . 967 967
Log-Likelihood -1636.167 -1639.142 -1639.852 -1643.846
' 5.95 7.37 15.36
*Tbe absolute value ofthe t'statistic is indicated in
l^ikelihood-ratio testofrestrictions against Model
'Significant at the 5% level.
''Significant at the 1% level.
parentheses.
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Table 6: Sal^, fiinge benefit, and working condition trade-offs.
Probit Estimates^ DollarEquivalent''
Saiary" 0.0383**
(5.68)
FringeBenefits
Incentive Plan 0.1482 $3,873
(1.47) (1.41)
Paid Time Off -0.0111 -$290
(0.08) (0.08)
Insurance Premiiuns*' 0.0992** $2.59*
(2.72) ' (2.41)
In-kind Transfers 0.0547 $1,429
(0.52) (0.51)
Retirement Plan 0.0691 $1,806
(0.58) (0.57)
Working Conditions
Excellent to Good -0.3960** -$10,352**
(3.03) (2.67)
Good to Fair -0.3036* -$7,938*
(2.53) (2.28)
Fair to Poor -0.0618 -$1,615
(0.24) (0:24)
Mask or Respirator 0.2604* $6,807*
(2.20) (2.04)
Individuaif Firm andRegional
Characteristics Yes
Included
N 1010
Log-likelihood ^70.77
*Theabsolute valueofthe t*statikic is indicated in parentheses.
""The dollar equivalent isestimated by dividing each ofthe FringeBenefit and Working Condition coefficients by theSalary coefficient
'Per $1,000.
•Significant at the 5% level.
**Significantatthe 1% level.
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